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Adhuc Tacfarinas. The causes of the Tiberian war in North Africa  
(AD ca. 15 – 24) and the impact of the conflict on Roman imperial policy  
 
Abstract 
During the reign of Tiberius successive governors of the province of Africa Proconsularis 
struggled to suppress a serious revolt by a number of semi-nomadic tribes lead by Tacfarinas. 
As expected, the size of the rebellion has elicited much scholarly attention. After a critical 
overview of various hypothetical explanations of its causes and their particular strengths and 
shortcomings, I argue that the conflict can only be explained convincingly as an indigenous 
act of negative negotiation of the Roman administrative encroachment on tribal territory. My 
argument is based on an in-depth analysis of the literary, epigraphic and archaeological 
evidence, combined with anthropological observations regarding pastoral migrations in 
modern Tunisia. The Revolt of Tacfarinas should not be perceived as a reaction against a 
Roman blockage of pastoral nomadic migrations, as banditry or as protest of disillusioned 
auxiliaries gone wrong. Instead, I propose that the rebels revolted against the outcome of 
cadastral activities launched straight after the Gaetulian War, which entailed taxation and 
confiscations. Thus, the rebellion does not support the traditional view of antagonism and lack 
of symbiosis between agriculturalist and nomadic communities in North Africa. Although 
Rome apparently achieved victory, the insurgents succeeded in renegotiating Roman 
administrative policy to their advantage. 
*** 
Many years ago, one scholar made the audacious statement that “tout ou presque a été dit sur 
la révolte de Tacfarinas”1. Scholars now seem to accept that the major questions regarding 
this revolt have been answered and that only the petty details have been left untouched. For 
them, the general course of events is clear: war broke out in AD 17 and after several 
governors had tried to defeat Rome’s enemies only the efficient military measures of P. 
Cornelius Dolabella (cos. ord. 10 AD) brought an end to seven eventful years of endemic 
guerrilla warfare in the North-African hinterland and Mauretania
2
. Tacitus relates how before 
the final victory was attained statues honoured, in vain, the military virtue of his 
predecessors
3
. Only in AD 24, when Tacfarinas was killed in the Battle at Auzia, did the 
Romains attain a decisive victory. Peace was restored, and soon the glorious proconsul made 
dedications to the goddess Victoria
4
.  
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 Although a consensus about the causes of the conflict has never really been reached in 
modern scholarship, most scholars seem to take the view that the Romans intended to block 
pastoral nomadic migrations. However, the overconfidence with which this story is currently 
told should not remain unquestioned. Many reconstructions are based solely upon a rather 
one-sided reading of Tacitus’ account, which is actually the most important literary source for 
this conflict
5
. Therefore, it is not surprising that the use of other source types and the quest for 
alternative interpretations of the literary evidence can often allow for reconstructions that are 
both innovative and persuasive. For instance, numismatic evidence comprising coins struck 
by the client kings of Mauretania in times of warfare not only question the traditional date and 
context of the onset of the hostilities, but also indicate that these kings were involved from the 
start, and not, as Tacitus relates, merely during the final stage of the war
6
. In the same way it 
will be argued here that interesting conclusions regarding the nature and causes of the conflict 
can be drawn from comparing Tacitus’ account with formerly neglected results of epigraphic 
and archaeological research regarding the penetration of the Romans in the interior of the 
province before and after their struggle against Tacfarinas. 
Other ancient authors devote only a few words to the conflict, and Tacitus also hardly offers a 
clue for its causes
7
. In fact, only on two occasions does he seem to allude specifically to the 
motives of Tacfarinas and his followers. At a certain point, Tacfarinas sent an emissary to 
Rome to announce an ultimatum. According to Tacitus, the terms and conditions for peace 
were respectively a sedes and a concessio agrorum, a place to dwell and an assignation of 
lands
8
. Indignation more than empathy may have marked the reaction of Tiberius: the 
ultimatum seems to have been perceived as a shameless request by most unrespectable 
villains. Of minor value is the second mention of the indigenous motives in Tacitus’ narration. 
In a (plausibly fictitious) appeal to the indigenous tribes of North Africa Tacfarinas presents 
the preservation or restoration of freedom or libertas as their collective aim and the purpose 
for which they were raising arms
9
. With no attention paid to matters of context and deeper 
causality, the second mention should be categorized as a general and stereotypical explanation 
of indigenous war motives.  
Yet in their search for more satisfactory explanations modern scholars have interpreted both 
statements by considering them against what they perceived as underlying conditions and 
contextual clues. Previously, the revolt was explained as a clash of different civilizations, an 
outbreak of violence due to the incompatibility of the nomadic and settled way of life
10
. Quite 
a similar view that enjoyed much popularity was that the indigenous tribes faced an imminent 
threat of colonization. The indigenous tribes would have revolted because the African interior 
was (about to be) overrun by Italian immigrants who were to settle in new colonies. By this 
large scale colonization Rome would thus have encouraged the spread of agriculture to the 
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 detriment of nomadism
11
. However, against this view it can be argued that no new colonies 
were established in the area either before or after the conclusion of the conflict. Therefore, the 




Nevertheless, a similar theory has been expounded, holding that Roman policy at least aimed 
at the control and canalization of nomadic migrations. In an article taking this position, 
Lassère suggested that a key role should be given to the construction of the road between 
Ammaedara and Tacape, which was finished under the auspices of proconsul L. Nonius 
Asprenas (cos. suff. AD 6) in AD 14
13
. The road would have been an effective means to 
control pastoral migrations and to defend agricultural domains and settlements from raiding 
nomads and their destructive flocks
14
. Especially at the isthmus between Tacape and the Chott 
el-Djerid, as well as in the region of Capsa the road would have formed an effective barrier. In 
fact, by its construction the Romans would have intended to consolidate the outcome of the 
Gaetulian War, in which the repression of pastoral migrations could have been a Roman 
objective as well
15
. Lassère’s theory actually goes back to Broughton, and has found 
considerable support ever since
16
.  
Despite its longstanding value as a persuasive explanation for the background and outbreak of 
the conflict, there are a number of serious objections to this hypothesis regarding the impact 
of the road construction. Firstly, and most obviously: how could this road form an effective 
barrier against pastoral migrations
17
? After all, Isaac correctly argued that roads should not be 
perceived as impediments to migration and movement. Instead, they catalyse them
18
. Of 
course, one could reduce the hypothesis a little and argue that the Romans did not intend to 
radically block these pastoral migrations, but instead merely aimed to control and observe 
them. However, even in this case there is little reason to assume that such less oppressive 
intentions entailed minor clashes and disputes that were likely to escalate to a widespread 
rebellion
19
. Nevertheless, apart from being an effect and catalyst of Roman military and 
administrative encroachment, the road could have formed some kind of (symbolic) marker of 
the territorial limits of Roman control
20
.   
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 Moreover, studies on nomadic pastoralism in modern Tunisia provide further criticism of the 
idea that by constructing the road from Tacape to Ammaedara the Romans intended to cut off 
pastoral migrations because these would have formed a threat to agriculturalists. The 
phenomenon of pastoral migration has been in (sharp) decline in the region since the mid-
twentieth century, but at least in the first half of the previous century, two forms of pastoral 
nomadism still prevailed
21
. One form consisted of rather short-range migrations. Pastoral 
nomadic groups pasture their flocks towards and in the south-eastern low steppes in winter. 
But in spring they gradually move upwards to the Tell in the northwest, where the altitude 
allows for a cooler climate. The second form is more regional in nature, as the herds come 
from the pre-desert further south. These migrations especially occur at the occasion of 
environmental disaster, like drought
22
. Obviously, they induce political instability as they 
increase pressure on pasture rights in the Tell. Therefore, during the nineteenth century the 
Ottoman administration took care to ensure the provision of regulated access to the northern 
pastures for the Bedouin from the south
23
.  
Now let us consider this migration pattern in relation to the chronology of the Roman 
campaigns. Tacitus mentions that the proconsul of AD 21-22, Q. Iunius Blaesus (cos. suff. 
AD 10), started to extend the war through the winter instead of leading the army to winter 
quarters
24
. Apparently, these winter quarters were located in Africa Vetus, in the coastal zone 
that formed the old province of Africa, and were thus at some distance from the critical zone 
of conflict in the interior
25
. The author also suggests that in the period before Blaesus’ 
strategic changes the proconsuls did not fight in winter, and he clearly relates that the new 
strategy was particularly favourable to the Romans. Importantly, even if one prefers to draw 
other migration trajectories, such as the course suggested by Leschi locating the winter 
pastures in the south-western region of Negrine, it is clear that this need for continuous 
military deployment is inconsistent with the seasonality of the pastoralist occupation of 
cultivable lands and hence of the conflicts with agriculturalists they presumably entailed
26
.  
Another way to verify the strength of the conflict hypothesis centred upon pastoral migrations 
is to take a closer look at the location and chronological setting of battles and sieges 
mentioned in Tacitus’ narrative. One would expect that most conflicts would take place along 
traditional nomadic migration routes or in areas where the presence of the flocks could 
endanger agriculturalist settlements. Admittedly, precise geographical indications of warfare 
are few, and if mentioned, their timing within the year is even more difficult to assess. 
Nevertheless the exercise is interesting enough to carry out. The first chronological indication 
might be derived from the position of the first section on the rebellion within the yearly 
structure of the Annales. However, its location at the very end the account of the events of AD 
17 probably stems from Tacitus’ intention to include this section as an additional note or 
anecdote. By doing so, Tacitus may either have aimed to reduce the gap between the account 
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 of these early events and the reports that follow in the following year. Or perhaps he may 
have considered that the events were not important enough and therefore favoured a short 
résumé at the end instead of different sections throughout the account of AD 17
27
. In the first 
section on the events of AD 20 a reference is also made to the first campaign. The latter is 
said to have taken place “priore aestate”28. Although this chronological indication is 
particularly interesting, as it alludes to an initial seasonal setting which is consistent with the 
later protraction of Roman active engagement through winter, one should not attribute too 
much value to it since it suggests that the first campaign should be dated to AD 19, which is 
obviously incorrect. Therefore it seems that the phrase as a whole is an interpolation. Yet, 
interestingly, the entire section on the events of AD 20 is located in the middle of the 
structural arrangement of the year. Moreover, it also contains a few geographical indications. 
The first indication is clearly too vague and refers imprecisely to “vicos” destroyed by the 
rebels. Where should these “vicos” be located? Who inhabited them? These questions simply 
cannot be answered. The Roman camp besieged near the river Pagyda cannot be identified 
either. It could have been located near any of the dozens of streams which descend from the 
Tell or the High Steppes towards the Tunisian coast, or any of the rivers which end up in the 
salty depression of the Chott-el-Djerid in the south. However, another location mentioned by 
Tacitus as a setting of combat is called Thala, and is well known
29
. It is situated about 20 km 
to the east of the Roman camp of Ammaedara, right in the territory of the Musulamii. The 
town is situated on the high plateaus, where modern nomads herd their flocks in summer. The 
next location is again marked by imprecision, as Tacfarinas is said to have moved “ad 
maritimos locos”30. The northern coast of Africa should probably be excluded, since the 
maritime regions in the (south)west are not only closer to Thala, but also much more easily 
reached. 
In the section that narrates Blaesus’ campaign of AD 22, another indirect geographical 
indication is given:  
“Ex quis Cornelius Scipio legatus praefuit qua praedatio in Leptitanos et suffugia 
Garamantum ; alio latere, ne Cirtensium pagi impune traherentur, propriam manum Blaesus 
filius duxit ; medio cum delectis, castella et munitiones idoneis locis imponens, dux ipse arta 
et infensa hostibus cuncta fecerat...” (Tac. Ann. 3, 74) 
 
By then the field of action seems to have spanned most of Africa Proconsularis
31
. The 
“Leptitanos” means either the inhabitants of Lepti Minor, situated near Thapsus, or those of 
Lepcis Magna. Lepti Minor could have been threatened by the Cinithii, who were allied with 
the Musulamii
32
. On the other hand, Lepcis Magna is more convincing since the author 
mentions that the same units were also used against the Garamantes, who lived to the south of 
this town. And there is also the aforementioned epigraphic attestation of the dedication the 
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 ultimate Roman victor, P. Cornelius Dolabella, made in this town to the goddess Victoria. At 
the same time, the rebellion seems to have threatened the region of Cirta, although at first 
sight this could seem an exaggeration on the part of Tacitus, in view of its distance from the 
territory of the Musulamii. Blaesus’ main force was located between both geographical 
extremes, in the region where the greatest danger was posed. Probably, this was actually the 
Musulamian heartland. The same episode refers to Blaesus’ pursuit of Tacfarinas into desert 
lands. For those persuaded by the blockage thesis, it could be tempting to accept this 
statement as firm evidence supporting the view that at that point the rebels were actually 
moving towards their winter pastures in the southern steppes, or swarmed the desert itself in 
flight. However, if this part of the narrative implies that rebellious nomadic groups led by 
Tacfarinas were migrating to the south, then it is particularly hard to understand why the 
Romans would now make the effort to try to harass the enemy when he is there where they 
actually want him to be, far from cultivated lands of (future) colonists. In fact, the “solitudo” 
and “mapalia” mentioned by Tacitus could also refer to the desolated interior and settlements 
of the High Steppes or the western Tell
33
. 
Thubuscum is mentioned by Tacitus in the final section of his account, but this could refer to 
either an unknown place, to Thubursicum Numidarum near Tipasa, Thubursicu Bure near 
Thugga or to Tubusuctu near Saldae
34
. With Thubursicu Bure ruled out, due to its proximity 
to Carthage, considerable doubts have been raised about its identification with Tubusuctu, 
since this town is located at a considerable distance from the lands of the Musulamii
35
. But 
there is also the distant location called Auzea, which was once devastated by the rebels and 
was the place where Tacfarinas’ life (and the rebellion) came to an end. If we agree to identify 
this location with Auzia (Sour El-Ghozlane?) in Mauretania, then it makes the identification 
of Tubuscum with Tubusuctu much more convincing. In addition, its distance from the 
territory of the Musulamii also reinforces the view that during Blaesus’ proconsulate the 
region of Cirta could have been threatened after all. Furthermore, it also provides further 
proof of the region-wide character of the insurrection and of the strong connection between 
the rebellion of Tacfarinas and the tribal discontentment with the administration of the client 
king(s) of the protectorate of Mauretania
36
. However, as a result of their absence or imprecise 
nature, the geographical and chronological indications in Tacitus’ account do not provide any 
clues that confirm the hypothesis that the conflict was an indigenous rebellion against a 
harmful Roman policy that was intended to block or control pastoral migrations between the 
Tell and the steppes. The wide range of military operations as much as Blaesus’ protraction of 
the war through winter (which should be connected with the pursuit of the rebels and their 
subsequent failure to regain strength in this period), are perfectly explained by the mobility of 
Rome’s opponents, but not the revolt’s causes. 
More recently, Kath again directed attention towards the possible impact of the road 
construction between Ammaedara and Tacape. The merits of her work lie not so much in the 
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 acknowledgement of a Roman road as “Herrschaftsinstrument” which like border stones and 
camps connected and symbolically denoted islands of conquered space, or in the recognition 
of possible limits the road could have posed to nomadic mobility. Far more innovative is her 
emphasis on the costs of the road construction. She suggested that the indigenous 
communities in the vicinity of the road had to pay substantial costs in terms of human and 
non-human labour and of (temporary) confiscation of material resources. If the scarce wells 
and sources were used for soldiers and road workers then the construction could have been 
too much of a burden to the local population
37
. However, if such a burden was indeed a 
primary cause of the conflict, then we would expect that violence would have broken out 
during the construction of the road, or at least before it was completed. Yet this was not the 
case: the first indications of Roman involvement in the conflict are provided by Tacitus and 
refer to AD 17, thus three years after the construction was finished. Moreover, it should be 
repeated that there is no evidence in favour of the view that A. Vibius Habitus (cos. suff. AD 
8), proconsul of AD 16/17, was involved in warfare
38
. And for the previous governor, L. 
Aelius Lama (cos. ord. AD 3), we have the statement of Velleius Paterculus which mentions 
that he was a decent commander who could not receive triumphal decorations due to the lack 
of military opportunities to prove himself
39
. In addition, it is difficult to agree with Gutsfeld 
and to interpret the aforementioned coin issues of Juba II as evidence of a Roman military 
engagement prior to AD 17
40
.    
A wholly different hypothesis was expounded by Trousset, who argued that the uprising of 
Tacfarinas should be linked with the fall of a local nomadic trade monopoly. Indigenous 
traders are supposed to have followed a commercial route from the Garamantes and the Syrte 
along the southern slopes of the Aurès to the larger urban nuclei in north(east)ern Mauretania. 
Italic traders would have redirected this route by using the newly created Roman road. 
Trousset believes that indigenous traders would easily have become strong supporters of 
Tacfarinas’ cause41. As we have no evidence at all concerning the existence of indigenous 
trade monopolies and their take-over by Italian merchants, this hypothesis is essentially based 
on assumptions and speculation. Furthermore, it should be noted that one passage in Tacitus’ 
account may allow us to repudiate the idea that the rebels’ fury was directed against Italic 
traders
42
. Our source mentions that two non-native traders, Carsidius Sacerdos and C. 
Gracchus, had been accused of trading wheat with Rome’s opponents in Africa43. Unexpected 
events of war could have led to a situation of low resources amongst the rebellious tribes or 
their armies, who consequently would have urged them to carry out such commercial 
exchanges. Indeed, the very fact that both individuals were spared by Tiberius possibly 
indicates that these accusations were false. Moreover, the “sordidas merces” mentioned in the 
same fragment is difficult to interpret, as it may just represent the stereotypical denunciation 
                                                          
37
 Kath 2009, 155-157. It is argued elsewhere that Roman law determined that the use of profluent water was a 
universal right enjoyed by both Romans and peregrini. At least in such cases, conflicts over water were possibly 
less frequent. Cf. Ørsted 2000, 93 and Gaius Inst. 2, 1.  
38
 Contra: Kath 2009, 150. PIR V 384. 
39
 Cf. Vell. Pat. 2, 116. PIR² A 200. 
40
 Gutsfeld 1989, 38-39 (n. 83) + 43. PIR² I 65. 
41
 Trousset 2002-2003, 368. 
42
 Tac. Ann. 4, 13. 
43
 PIR² C 451. 
 of commercial activities
44
. However, the relationship between rebels and Italic traders drawn 
by Tacitus is the only one we know of, and it is undeniably positive. Furthermore, Whittaker’s 
suggestion that this passage actually confirms his view that migrant groups protested against 
their loss of status and wealth due to Roman intervention in the marketplace, is based on 
assumptions, and seems to be just the opposite of “almost certainly” persuading45. Moreover, 
no clear-cut evidence can help us to measure the impact of what Fentress called the 
“progressive disembedding of the economy and, eventually, the individual” at this early stage 
of Roman occupation
46
. It is therefore difficult to explain the revolt as the outcome of 
increasing pressure on the traditional socio-economic system in the context of an expanding 
market economy.   
To many scholars it may be tempting to reduce the conflict to acts of banditry. After all, does 
Tacitus not denote Rome’s enemies as latrones whose sole purpose was booty, murder and 
terror
47
? This description can surely gain additional value if we acknowledge that the picture 
of nomads in search of booty aligns with certain aspects of the so-called trade-or-raid model 
from anthropology. This model of nomadic-sedentary relations is centred upon the lack of 
economic autarchy of the pastoral nomadic economy
48
. In order to acquire certain 
commodities (grain, artisanal products) nomadic groups have to fall back on sedentary 
economies. This need is obviously particularly high in the case of a natural disaster, such as a 
drought, which can severely affect flock numbers. If the nomadic population group is not able 
to acquire the goods it needs through commercial exchange (or labour), they can decide to 
take it manu militari (or by the extortion of tribute). Apart from the doubts that should 
surround the hypothesis that Tacitus actually had such an insight into this particular trait of 
nomadic economies, there are other arguments which make us question the applicability of 
this model. Firstly, there are no direct indications of an environmental disaster. Perhaps the 
aforementioned commercial transaction between Tacfarinas’ army and Roman merchants 
represents an indirect and extremely controversial event that might point to the occurrence of 
a natural calamity. In Tunisia, Clarke observed, perilous periods of famine and water shortage 
also made nomads migrate more to the north
49
. Yet, the only clear attestation of nomads 
“latius vagantes” in North Africa during the early imperial period relates to the Gaetulian War 
(AD ca. 3 – 6) and is irrelevant for the revolt under discussion50. Therefore, in case they really 
took place, the contacts with the Italic traders can be most convincingly explained in the 
context of a shortage of food among the indigenous population or its army due to the 
exceptional context of war. Secondly, when considering the applicability of the trade-or-raid 
paradigm one should first take into account that there are no indications of a disruption of 
existing exchange possibilities before the outbreak of the rebellion. And finally, it should be 
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 remembered that the Musulamii formed a semi-nomadic tribe, which made them more 
autarchic than fully nomadic tribes. One can provide a fourth counterargument by connecting 
Tacitus’ discourse to the overall negative Roman perception of nomadism, or by linking it 
with an effort to evocate the hit-and-run strategies of the tribes
51
. Tacitus mentions this type 
of guerrilla warfare explicitly, as “dum ea ratio barbaro fuit inritum fessumque Romanum 
impune ludificabatur”52. Furthermore, Tacitus was possibly referring to latrocinium in a legal 
sense. After all, Roman sources used this term to denote the unlawful exercise of (political 
and military) power, for instance by starting a war that was unjust – from the Roman point of 
view, of course
53. Finally, the minimalist description of Rome’s enemies as bandits could 
have been motivated by the author’s intention to ridicule the position of Tiberius and his 
incompetent governors. After all, Tacitus actually seems to describe the image of escalated 
banditry in his very first passage on the conflict:  
“Is natione Numida, in castris Romanis auxiliaria stipendia meritus, mox desertor vagos 
primum et latrociniis suetos ad praedam et raptus congregare, dein more militiae per vexilla 
et turmas componere, postremo non inconditae turbae sed Musulamiorum dux haberi.” (Tac. 
Ann. 2, 52) 
 
Interestingly, Shaw proposed a different hypothesis based on this particular fragment
54
, which 
may be seen as an elaboration of Sherwin-White’s view. He believes that Rome dealt with a 
revolt of former auxiliarii who had fought for the Roman cause during the Gaetulian War. 
The auxiliarii would have waited in vain for their reward: Roman citizenship or a land grant 
(expressed by the sedes and concessio agrorum mentioned by Tacitus). This discontentment, 
Shaw argues, eventually led to the outbreak of the revolt lead by Tacfarinas
55
. In fact, this 
theory recalls in part Syme’s view that the rebellion was fuelled by indigenous deception over 
the speed of their integration (and promotion) within the Roman Empire
56. Shaw’s theory is 
tempting, but there are three counterarguments. First, there is no mention of such auxiliaries 
in the Roman army during the Gaetulian War
57
. Moreover, it is rather difficult to link the 
formation of a great nomadic coalition (Cinithii, Musulamii, Garamantes, undefined Mauri 
and no doubt others) with the benefits of a small group of disillusioned auxiliaries who would 
have fought against the cause of most (semi-nomadic) indigenous actors in the region. Finally, 
Shaw’s theory falls in tatters if we recognize that the Romans fought several of these tribes 
during the Gaetulian War as well. The Musulamii, for instance, are named in both conflicts as 
enemies of Rome. If one adheres to Shaw’s thesis, then one supports the odd view that during 
the Gaetulian War pro-Roman and contra-Roman indigenous factions of the same tribe fought 
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 against each other, yet made up the internal quarrel after the conclusion of the war and then 
started another conflict because of the maltreatment of those groups who formerly fought on 
the Roman side. Even though fluidity of political relations between and within the tribes 
forms a typical feature of nomadic societies, no one should feel too comfortable with these 
implications of Shaw’s theory. Shaw erroneously assumes that Tacitus created an exaggerated 
image of the war, yet the epigraphically attested dedications as much as the senatorial 
discussions and the temporary reinforcement of the Legio III Augusta by the Legio IX 
Hispana indicate that the struggle was more than just an occasional skirmish. Importantly, it 
has been argued that Tacitus’  descriptions of wars and external conflicts generally tend to be 
deliberately minimalistic in the Annales, because “by narrating his wars in a manner that was 
unattractive by conventional historiographical criteria, he reinforces the sense of the corrupt 
state of Rome under the Julio-Claudians, partly by focusing the reader’s attention on domestic 
affairs, and partly by suggesting that the emperors, among other crimes and flaws, were no 
longer running the Empire according to the canon of traditional military glory”58. If these 
observations are correct, there is little reason to assume that Tacitus actually intended to 
exaggerate the size of the present conflict. 
 
The long list of hypotheses, explanations and propositions found in modern literature that we 
have surveyed so far is beset by doubts and criticisms. In the remaining part of my paper I 
show that new and hitherto neglected archaeological and epigraphic sources from the 
Tunisian interior provide clear indications that the Roman administrators at least intended to 
pursue a policy of (nominal) expropriation and taxation at the time of the outbreak of the 
rebellion. Importantly, it should be emphasized that this land was not used by pastoralists 
(only), but (rather) by indigenous agriculturalists.  
After all, the North African interior certainly contained fertile land suitable for cultivation. 
Moreover, the indigenous population did not need Roman instructions in order to recognize 
and reap the benefits of agriculture
59
. In spite of literary descriptions of the interior that tend 
to emphasize the desolation of the desert and the ubiquitous wanderings of the nomad, it is 
clear that agriculture was an important component of the economy wherever the 
environmental conditions were suitable. Accordingly, there is evidence of indigenous 
agriculture dating to the pre-Roman period. Herodotus not only mentions Libyan farmers 
called Maxyes who dwelled near the Chott-el-Djerid, he also refers to farmers in the 
mountainous interior of North Africa
60
. In fact, Camps has argued that pre-Roman cultivation 
was not limited to the plains
61
. Indeed, with sufficient precipitation per annum, the Low and 
Middle Tell could provide wheat yields that were not at all poor
62
. Moreover, where rainfall 
was inadequate, the population often resorted to irrigation techniques. In contrast to their 
former characterizations as Roman imports, Shaw and Mattingly have pointed to the 
indigenous nature of the organization and material structure of these installations in Africa 
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 and Tripolitania
63
. Similarly, Janon has related that such irrigation techniques rendered 
agricultural activities profitable in the Aurès mountains
64
. The observations made by these 
ancient historians and archaeologists are perfectly analogous with relatively recent 
ethnographical and geographical accounts of semi-nomadic communities of the steppes, the 
mountains and the pre-desert. These studies show how throughout the eastern Maghreb semi-
nomadic groups live(d) through a succession of periods of pastoral nomadic migration 
followed by times of settlement combined with dry farming and arboriculture
65
.  
These insights provide an important contrast to the description of Tacitus, who confers the 
stereotypical view of vagrant tribes “nullum etiam tum urbium cultu” on the revolting 
Musulamii
66
. Notably, further contrast is provided by Sallustius, who attests that the river 
banks of the Muthul (which in all probability was situated in Musulamian territory) were 
covered with shrubs and used by both herdsmen and farmers
67
. This statement gains weight as 
we consider the historian’s past assignment as proconsul of Africa. Clearly, while advancing 
step by step in the interior of Africa the Romans did not encounter just desolate deserts and 
empty wastelands. Instead, in many places they found villages that contained potential 
taxpayers, farmers and pastoralists. Therefore, we should not neglect this complex dual 
economic orientation of the indigenous semi-nomadic society. In fact, it suggests that not only 
impediments to pastoralism – such as the supposed blockade of nomadic migration routes – 
could have damaged relations between the Romans and the indigenous tribes: disruptions 
could equally have been triggered by the intentions and effects of Roman administration on 
the agricultural basis of the indigenous economy. When Lassère interpreted Tacfarinas’ 
request for a “sedes” as an indigenous recognition of defeat and of future settlement, he failed 




Shaw vigorously countered the traditional confinement hypothesis
69
. Considering the land 
measurements and allocations dating (for the most part) to the reign of Trajan, he argued that 
the indigenous tribes were not confined to reservations consisting of poorly cultivable lands. 
This is a valuable observation, with an important implication for our perception of Roman 
provincial policy in the region. However, it does not compel us to concur with Shaw’s 
conclusion that the land rights of the Musulamii were never threatened. After all, there is a 
large chronological gap between the Revolt of Tacfarinas and these Trajanic delimitations. In 
his careful attempt to align a troubled page in the history of Roman Africa with the recently 
established paradigm of symbiosis between the (semi-)nomadic tribes and the Roman 
administration, Shaw dismisses the possibility that at some point between the reign of 
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 Augustus and Hadrian Roman policy in the region could have been subject to significant 
change.  
In fact, Trousset has pointed out that this chronological gap does not eliminate the possibility 
that there was a certain connection between the Tiberian and Trajanic cadastral activities. His 
relatively recent discovery of a reused border marker as well as other evidence of 
convergence allowed this French scholar to show that the delimitations of the late first and 
early second century AD were fundamentally based on the earlier cadastral project of C. 
Vibius Marsus (cos. suff. AD 17) in the Tiberian era
70. Trousset’s findings thus seem to 
confirm Shaw’s static and presumably benevolent appreciation of Rome’s treatment of the 
indigenous land rights from the late Tiberian period onwards
71
. But how does the rebellion of 
Tacfarinas relate to this, and where does the apparent benevolence stem from?  
Interestingly, Trousset’s observations would not be so valuable if we failed to grasp the true 
scope and development of the cadastral undertakings that unfolded in the early first century 
AD. A long time ago, Caillemer and Chevallier related that the cadastral activities which C. 
Vibius Marsus terminated in AD 29 in the south of the province, in the region of Turris 
Tamalleni, may have started much earlier in the north
72
. Twenty years later, Fentress 
suggested that the survey which preceded the road between Ammaedara and Tacape “was 
linked to the survey necessary for the centuriation”73. Hence, she also believed that in and 
along the territory of the Musulamii, the first land measurements probably took place well 
before AD 14, the year when the road was finished. Most recently, an expedition by a team of 
archaeologists and geographers provided an in-depth study of the limitatio of the interior of 
Africa Proconsularis. Their research, which was conducted throughout the entire region, 
brought about particularly striking results. They not only confirmed that the aforementioned 
cadastral work in the south of the province definitely started in the north, as the gromae locus 
was to be found near Ammaedara; they also observed that there must have been a survey that 
formed the basis for both the late Augustan construction of the road between Ammaedara and 
Tacape and the later Tiberian limitatio in the south, evidenced by the strong geodesic 
correlation between both undertakings
74
. It follows that there must have been at least three 
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 cadastral campaigns: (1) an Augustan campaign following the Gaetulian War, which provided 
the forma that influenced the trajectory of the road, (2) the Tiberian campaign in the south 
during the proconsulate of C. Vibius Marsus, after the Tacfarinan uprising, and finally (3) the 
Trajanic delimitations.   
The implications from these observations are particularly far-reaching. If we accept that the 
first survey was conducted during the reign of Augustus, then we cannot easily recognize that 
“l’ouverture de cette route est le seul événement connu qui ait pu entraîner une sedition”75. 
Instead, the reconstruction of the various cadastral campaigns revitalizes the old but poorly 
defended theory that the indigenous tribes effectively faced an imminent (nominal) loss of 
land or the imposition of taxation shortly before the outbreak of the war against Tacfarinas 
and his Gaetulian and Numidian tribes
76
.  
We can now discern the various stages of Roman policy in the region after the conclusion of 
the Gaetulian War. At first, Roman administrative aims were aggressive, as the governors 
intended to expropriate or tax the local indigenous tribes. For this reason, the camp of the 
Legio III Augusta was moved to Ammaedara in the interior of the province of Africa. Among 
the soldiers were land measurers, who had been ordered to make an extensive land survey. 
Based on this survey, a road was built from Ammaedara to Tacape. The next logical step was 
the delimitation of tribal territories and/or the imposition of taxes. This was the point at which 
the local population reacted. First, wholly in lign with comparable cadastral disputes attested 
elsewhere, an envoy was sent to Rome to reach a more beneficial land settlement
77
. The 
emissary was not successful, and the province became the scene of bloody turmoil for more 
than seven years. The conflict took the form of an indigenous act of negative negotiation of 
Roman encroachment on tribal territory, and found support among the various tribes of the 
region who shared this concern.  
Importantly, this reconstruction of the context and causes of the Revolt of Tacfarinas does not 
counter the idea that effectuated land delimitations did not play a role in the outbreak of the 
rebellion in the north. After all, epigraphic attestations of delimitations in this region only 
appear in the epigraphic record during the reign of Trajan. However, in the northern area, 
right in the heartland of the revolting Musulamii, the presence of the gromae locus provides 
firm evidence that land measurements had been conducted in the period preceding the Revolt 
of Tacfarinas. Yet the absence, contrary to their omnipresence in the south, of direct traces of 
cadastral activities (such as border stones and cadastral markers) of the Augustan or Tiberian 
period also indicates that at that time the heartland of the Musulamii was not the scene of an 
effective expropriation or taxation policy.  
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 I suggest that this discrepancy between the north and the south was a direct result of the 
Revolt of Tacfarinas. The many hardships Rome suffered during the war probably convinced 
the Roman authorities to take indigenous demands into account (the “concessio agrorum” and 
“sedes” mentioned by Tacitus) and adapt their policy regarding the confiscation or taxation of 
indigenous (arable) land – or at least to slow down its execution78. Therefore, if one 
acknowledges Shaw’s view that “the boundary stones do concede an immense formal 
territorium to the Musulamii” and do not prove “any delineation of less favourable lands or a 
lesser extent of land”, and if one recognizes his view that “this would seem to betoken a 
special treatment of a favourable kind rather than a harsh containment policy”, then one 
should surely take into account the bloody context which created the formation of this more 
deliberate strategy
79
. Moreover, it should be noted that as an act of negative negotiation of 
Roman administrative measures that had been imposed too early on the superficially 
subjected peoples, the Tacfarinan rebellion is reminiscent of the Germanic revolt that crushed 
the legions of P. Quinctilius Varus (cos. ord. 13 BC) a few years earlier, in AD 9
80
. 
Obviously, the resemblance between the revolt of Arminius and Tacfarinas’ rebellion may 
end here. In Africa, a Roman victory initiated eight additional decades of Roman government 
that softened the seditious spirit in ways famously described elsewhere by Tacitus
81
. This 
process may have induced the creation of trustworthy mediators among the indigenous elites 
and a gradual change of local socio-economic, cultural and political structures, in such a way 
that these communities became less negatively responsive to Roman administrative measures. 
In fact, members of the Musulamian tribe later left a number of epigraphic traces attesting to 
their adoption of Latin and the identification with Roman social structures, as well as their 
presence among the ranks of the auxilia
82
. 
Moreover, the reconstruction defended above does not question the view, expressed recently, 
about the impact of the political instability in Mauretania on the outbreak of the revolt. Not 
merely does Cassius Dio clearly state that this factor played a role in the Gaetulian War
83
. 
Numismatic evidence reveals that the subsequent client kings of Mauretania, Juba II and 
Ptolemaeus, supported the Romans during the entire conflict and not only, as might be 
derived from Tacitus, near the end of the conflict
84
. The evidence also tends to indicate that 
they were actually involved in military activities before the Roman campaigns started. The 
early military engagement could be explained in two ways. Least convincing is the 
explanation that, at the first signs of rebellion and insurgence in Africa Proconsularis, the 
Romans commanded Juba II to crush the enemy, yet intervened at the moment when the client 
king proved to be unable to withstand the insurrection. After all, the Roman proconsuls do not 
seem to have been involved in any kind of warfare whatsoever  between AD 15 and 17 (cf. 
supra), and giving a military assignment within a Roman province to a client king seems 
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 fairly implausible. Instead, Juba II was probably involved in a strictly internal conflict with 
(semi-)nomadic tribes, as was the case in the Gaetulian War. In the latter case it is not difficult 
to grasp the catalysing force of such a conflictual situation just across the border of Africa 
Proconsularis, where the Romans planned to encroach on the North African interior
85
. 
In conclusion, this reconstruction highlights the dynamic nature of the relations between the 
indigenous peoples and the Roman administrators in North Africa. Previously, these relations 
have far too often been described as static and one-sided, either in terms of overt political and 
economic antagonism, or (though much less frequently) unquestioned symbiosis
86
. Hence, the 
Tacfarinan uprising was first primarily understood as a clash between two incompatible 
modes of living, pastoral nomadism and sedentary agriculture. In the end, the revolt became 
an annoying event to the adherents of the symbiosis paradigm and was consequently 
downscaled to a form of escalated banditry. However, in our view, the rebellion should be 
understood as an act of negative negotiation that illustrates how an act of insurgence could 
have an effective impact on Rome’s administration. The uprising, its causes and its 
consequences underline the importance not only of appreciating the complex and discrepant 
character of the integration trajectories of specific indigenous tribes, but also of recognising 
the fluid and potentially negotiable nature of Roman provincial policy in a particular region.  
Bibliography 
ALFÖLDY, G. 1965 "La politique provinciale de Tibère", Latomus 24, pp. 824-844 
ASC/CNES[ARCHÉOLOGIE] 2005, "Voies romaines. La voie romaine d'Asprenas et la grande 
centuriation de Tunisie", Toulouse. Available online:  
  http://voies.archeo-rome.com/voies01.html (last accessed October 22
nd
 2013) 
BÉNABOU, M. 1976, La résistance africaine à la romanisation, Paris: F. Maspero 
——— 1977 "Tacfarinas", Les Africains 7, pp. 293-313 
BERTHIER, A. 1981, La Numidie : Rome et le Maghreb, Paris: Picard 
BROUGHTON, T. R. S. 1929, The romanization of Africa proconsularis, Baltimore, London: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, Oxford University Press 
CAGNAT, R. 1912, L'Armée romaine d'Afrique et l'occupation militaire de l'Afrique sous les 
empéreurs, Paris: Leroux 
CAILLEMER, A. and R. CHEVALLIER 1957 "Die römische Limitation in Tunesien", Germania 
35, pp. 45-54 
CAMPS, G. 1960 "Aux origines de la berberie. Masinissa ou les débuts de l'histoire", Libyca 8, 
pp. 1-320 
CHARLES-PICARD, G. 1959, La civilisation de l'Afrique romaine, Paris: Plon 
CHARLESWORTH, M. P. 1934, "Chapter XIX: Tiberius", in: C. S. A., F. E. Adcock and C. M. 
P., eds., The Cambridge Ancient History pp. 607-652 
CHERRY, D. 1998, Frontier and society in Roman North Africa, Oxford: Clarendon press 
CHEVALLIER, R. 1957 "Essai de chronologie des centuriations romaines de Tunisie", 
Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire de l'École Française de Rome 69, pp. 61-128 
CLARKE, J. I. 1955 "Summer Nomadism in Tunisia", Economic Geography 31, pp. 157-167 
——— 1959 "Studies of Semi-Nomadism in North Africa", Economic Geography 35, pp. 95-
108 
                                                          
85
 Vanacker 2013. 
86
 Cf. *********** 
 COLTELLONI-TRANNOY, M. 2002, Le royaume de Maurétanie sous Juba II et Ptolémée (25 av. 
J.C. - 40 ap. J.-C.), Paris: CNRS 
D'ARMS, J. H. 1981, Commerce and social standing in ancient Rome, Cambridge Harvard 
University Press 
DECRAMER, L. R. 2002 "La grande centuriation tunisienne et la voie d'Asprenas. Pour une 
chronologie des cadastres, routes et limites antiques", Bulletin de la Société nationale 
des antiquaires de France, pp. 287-309 
DECRAMER, L. R., R. HILTON and A. PLAS 2001, "Centuriations et orientation solaire. Les 
bornes gromatiques du Tunisie", La mesure des longues distances dans le cadre des 
limitations antiques, Lattes: Archeo-Rome, pp. 3-36. Available online:  
  http://www.archeo-rome.com/themes2/Centuriation%20et%20orientation3.htm (last 
accessed  October 22
nd
 2013) 
DECRET, F., M. H. FANTAR and A. LEROUX 1981, L'Afrique du Nord dans l'antiquité : histoire 
et civilisation, des origines au Ve siècle, Paris: Payot 
DEMEERSEMAN, A. 1965 "Aux frontières de la psychologie rurale", Revue de l'Institut des 
Belles-Lettres Arabes 28, pp. 1-34 
DESPOIS, J. 1942 "Régions naturelles et régions humaines en Tunisie", Annales de 
Géographie 51, pp. 112-128 
——— 1945 "Types of Native Life in Tripolitania", Geographical Review 35, pp. 352-367 
DESPOIS, J. and J. DRESCH 1958, L'Afrique du Nord, Paris: Presses universitaires de France 
DEVALLET, G. 2001, "Vagi, palantes Afri: quelques réflexions sur l'image romaine du nomade 
africain", in: F. Bejaoui, ed., Histoire des Hautes Steppes. Antiquité - Moyen Âge, 
Sbeitla, pp. 31-38 
ECK, W. 1990, "Terminationen als administratives Problem: das Beispiel der 
nordafrikanischen Provinzen". In A. Mastino, ed., L'Africa romana. Atti del VII 
convegno di studio (15-17 dicembre 1989), Sassari, pp. 933-941 
FENTRESS, E. W. B. 1979, Numidia and the Roman Army : social, military and economic 
aspects of the frontier zone, Oxford: BAR 
——— 2006 "Romanizing the Berbers", Past & Present 190, pp. 3-33 
FUSHÖLLER, D. 1979, Tunesien und Ostalgerien in der Römerzeit : zur historischen 
Geographie des östlichen Atlasafrika vom Fall Karthagos bis auf Hadrians Limesbau, 
Bonn: Habelt 
GARZETTI, A. 1960, L'Impero da Tiberio agli Antonini, Bologna: Cappelli 
GONZALÈS, A. 1998, "La révolte comme acte de brigandage: Tacite et la révolte de 
Tacfarinas.", in: M. Khanoussi, P. Ruggeri and C. Vismara, eds., L'Africa romana. Atti 
del XII convegno di studio, Sassari: Ed. Democratica Sarda, pp. 937-958 
GUTSFELD, A. 1989, Römische Herrschaft und einheimischer Widerstand in Nordafrika, 
Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 
HALLET, S. 1975 "Mountain Villages of Southern Tunisia", Journal of Architectural 
Education 79, pp. 22-25 
HARMAND, L. and A. GRENIER 1960, L'Occident romain: Gaule - Espagne - Bretagne - 
Afrique du Nord (31 av. J.C. à 235 ap. J.C.), Paris: Payot 
ISAAC, B. 1992, The limits of Empire. The Roman army in the East, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
JANON, M. 1977, "Lambèse et l'occupation militaire de la Numidie méridionale", in: H. D. and 
H. H. G., eds., Studien zu den Militärgrenzen Roms II: Vorträge des 10. 
Internationalen Limeskongresses in der Germania Inferior, Bonn: Habelt, pp. 473-485 
——— 1982, "Paysans et soldats", in: C. M. Wells, ed., Roman Africa, Ottawa, pp. 51-67 
KALI-COULIBALY, I. 2007. "Une borne du pays musulame". Cahiers du Centre Gustave-Glotz, 
18, pp. 409-411. 
 KATH, R. 2009, "Die Straße als provincia: die römische Raumerfassung und der Konflikt mit 
den Musulamii (1. Jh. n. Chr.)", in: R. Kath and A.-K. Rieger, eds., Raum - Landschaft 
- Territorium. Zur Konstruktion physischer Räume als nomadischer und sesshafter 
Lebensraum, Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, pp. 149-172 
KHAZANOV, A. M. 1994, Nomads and the Outside World, Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press 
LASSÈRE, J.-M. 1982 "Un conflit 'routier': observations sur les causes de la guerre de 
Tacfarinas", Antiquités africaines 18, pp. 11-25 
LESCHI, L. 1942 "Rome et les Nomades du Sahara central", Travaux de l'Institut de 
Recherches Sahariennes, pp. 47-62 
LEVEAU, P. (1988). Le pastoralisme dans l'Afrique antique. In C. R. Whittaker, ed., Pastoral 
Economies in Classcial Antiquity, Cambridge: The Cambrdige Philological Society, 
pp. 177-195). 
LEVENE, D. S. 2009, "Warfare in the Annals", in: A. J. Woodman, ed., The Cambridge 
Companion to Tacitus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 225-240 
LOUIS, A. 1969 "Evolution des modes de vie au Sahara tunisien", Revue de l'Institut des 
Belles-Lettres Arabes 32, pp. 71-101 
MANGANARO, G. 1987, "Tacfarinas e la Sicilia (ovvero L. Apronius e il santuario ericino)", 
in: A. Mastino, ed., L’Africa romana. Atti del IV convegno di studio, Sassari, pp. 581-
585 (+ Pl.) 
MATTINGLY, D. J. 1986 "New Perspectives on the Agricultural Development of Gebel and 
Pre-Desert in Roman Tripolitania", Revue des mondes musulmans et de la 
Méditerranée 41, pp. 45-65 
NORRIS, H. T. 1953 "125. Cave Habitations and Granaries in Tripolitania and Tunisia", Man 
53, pp. 82-85 
ØRSTED, P. 2000, "Centuriation and Infrastructure", in: P. Ørsted, J. Carlsen, L. L. Sebaï and 
H. Ben Hassen, eds., Africa Proconsularis. Regional Studies in the Segermes Valley of 
Northern Tunisia, Gylling: Aarhus University Press, pp. 75-104 
PETIT, P. 1974, Histoire générale de l'Empire romain, Paris: Seuil 
PICOUET, M. 1971 "Aperçu des migrations intérieures en Tunisie", Population 26, pp. 125-
148 
RACHET, M. 1970, Rome et les Berbères. Un problème militaire d'Auguste à Dioclétien, 
Bruxelles: Latomus 
RAVEN, S. 1993, Rome in Africa, London: Routledge 
ROMANELLI, P. 1959, Storia delle province romane dell'Africa, Roma: L'erma di 
Bretschneider 
SAREL-STERNBERG, B. 1963, "Semi-nomades du Nefzaoua", in: C. Bataillon, ed., Nomades et 
nomadisme au Sahara, Paris: UNESCO, pp. 123-133 
SEKLANI, M. 1960 "Villes et campagnes en Tunisie. Evaluations et prévisions", Population 
15, pp. 485-512 
SHAW, B. D. 1982, "Fear and loathing: the nomad menace and Roman Africa", in: C. M. 
Wells, ed., Roman Africa, Ottawa: The University of Ottawa Press, pp. 29-50 
——— 1982 "Lamasba: an ancient irrigation community", Antiquités africaines 18, pp. 61-
103 
——— 1982-1983 "'Eaters of Flesh, Drinkers of Milk': the Ancient Mediterranean Ideology 
of the Pastoral Nomad", Ancient Society 13/14, pp. 5-31 
SHERWIN-WHITE, A. N. 1973, The Roman citizenship, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
SIRAGO, V. A. 1988, "Tacfarinas", in: A. Mastino, ed., L'Africa romana. Atti del V Convegno 
di studio, Sassari, pp. 199-204 
 SYME, R. 1951, "Tacfarinas, the Musulamii and Thubursicu", in: P. R. Coleman-Norton, F. C. 
Bourne and J. V. A. Fine, eds., Studies in Roman economic and social history in honor 
of Allan Chester Johnson, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 113-130 
TROUSSET, P. 1982 "L'image du nomade saharien dans l'historiographie", Production 
pastorale et société 10, pp. 97-105 
——— 1997, "Un nouveau document sur la limitatio de C. Vibius Marsus (Sud Tunisien)", 
in: W. Groenman-Van Waateringe, B. L. W. Van Beek, W. J. H. and S. L. Wynia, 
eds., XVIth International Congress of Roman Frontier Studies, Oxford, pp. 3-11 
——— 2002-2003 "Le tarif de Zaraï: essai sur les circuits commerciaux dans la zone 
présaharienne", Antiquités africaines 38-39, pp. 355-373 
VANACKER, W. 2013a, "Conflicts and Instability in Mauretania and Gaius’ Realpolitik", 
Latomus 72 (3), pp. 725-741 
***************, (forthcoming) 
VON SIVERS, P. 1975 "Insurrection and Accommodation: Indigenous Leadership in Eastern 
Algeria, 1840-1900", International Journal of Middle East Studies 6, pp. 259-275 
WHITTAKER, C. R. 1978 "Land and labour in North Africa", Klio 60, pp. 331-362 
 
  
